Abstract John Searle's Chinese Room Argument (CRA) purports to demonstrate that syntax is not sucient for semantics, and hence that because computation cannot yield understanding, the computational theory of mind, which equates the mind to an information processing system based on formal computations, fails. In this paper, we use the CRA, and the debate that emerged from it, to develop a philosophical critique of recent advances in robotics and neuroscience. We describe results from a body of work that contributes to blurring the divide between biological and articial systems: so-called animats, autonomous robots that are controlled by biological neural tissue, and what may be described as remote-controlled rodents, living animals endowed with augmented abilities provided by external controllers. We argue that, even though at rst sight these chimeric systems may seem to escape the CRA, on closer analysis they do not. We conclude by discussing the role of the bodybrain dynamics in the processes that give rise to genuine understanding of the world, in line with recent proposals from enactive cognitive science 1 . ... the people who are giving me all of these symbols call the rst batch a script, they call the second batch a story and they call the third batch questions. Furthermore, they call the symbols I give them back in response to the third batch answers to the questions and the set of rules in English that they gave me, they call the program. Now just to complicate the story a little, imagine that these people also give me stories in English, which I understand, and they then ask me questions in English about these stories, and I give them back answers in English. Suppose also that after a while I get so good at following the instructions for manipulating the Chinese symbols and the programmers get so good at writing the programs that from the This paper is not an attempt to buttress the CRA. In what follows, we will briey review the`System' and`Robot' replies, before introducing a number of successes in a new branch of robotics that contributes to blurring the divide between biological and articial systems. We aim to use these examples to articulate a response to current trends in cognitive robotics in line with Searle's position as espoused in the CRA. To cut to the gist, we show that if the CRA holds then it also holds against both cognitive robotics and bio-machine hybrids (animats) [as currently engineered].
1 Searle's Chinese Room Argument
The CRA in a nutshell
In developing the Chinese Room Argument in his paper`Minds, Brains and Programs' (MBP) [Searle(1980) ] John Searle gave birth to one of the most notorious debates in the history of philosophy of mind [Cole(2009) , Preston and Bishop(2002) ].
Searle's argument refutes the strong claim of articial intelligence, which he coined Strong AI, that of creating a truly intelligent computational device, demonstrating machine understanding [Searle(1980), p. 417 ]. This lasting debate has important consequences for cognitive science in general, and the computational theory of mind in particular, which equates the mind to an information processing system based on formal computations [Fodor(1975) , Fodor(1987) , Putnam(1988) ]. If Searle's position in the debate is correct, it also shows the inadequacy of any purely behavioural procedure (e.g. Turing's test') to identify intelligence 2 .
In 1977, Schank and Abelson published information on a script 3 based software system that they had developed to answer questions on simple stories [Schank and Abelson(1977) ]. The program takes as input a simple story and, using sets of rules, heuristics and scripts, is able to infer answers to questions about the story posed by an operator. Searle gives the example of a story depicting a man entering a restaurant, ordering a hamburger and storming outside the restaurant disappointed. If asked Did the man eat the hamburger?, the program would unequivocally answer No, he did not, based on its script outlining the typical expected behaviour exhibited by customers visiting restaurants.
In the CRA, by demonstrating that syntax is not sucient for semantics, Searle responds to the claim that the appropriately programmed computer genuinely`understands' the data it processes; for example, the claim that Schank and Abelson's software actually understands the text it processes. To this end, Searle described a thought experiment in which he was locked in a room, and provided with`a large batch of Chinese writing'. As Searle does not speak a word of Chinese, to him these Chinese ideographs were just so many meaningless squiggles (ibid. p. 418). Searle is then presented with a second batch of Chinese script together with a set of rules [which Searle can understand] for correlating the second batch with the rst batch. Some time later Searle is subsequently given:
... a third batch of Chinese symbols together with some instructions, again in English, that enable me to correlate elements of this third batch 2 In what has become known as the standard interpretation of the Turing test, a human interrogator, interacting with two respondents via text alone, has to determine which of the responses is being generated by a suitably programmed computer and which is being generated by a human; if the interrogator cannot reliably do this then the computer is deemed to have passed the Turing test.
3 In their work Schank and Abelson used scripts to specify a detailed description of stereotypical events unfolding through time in given contexts.
with the rst two batches, and these rules instruct me how to give back certain Chinese symbols with certain sorts of shapes in response to certain sorts of shapes given me in the third batch.
Unbeknownst to Searle: ... the people who are giving me all of these symbols call the rst batch a script, they call the second batch a story and they call the third batch questions. Furthermore, they call the symbols I give them back in response to the third batch answers to the questions and the set of rules in English that they gave me, they call the program. Now just to complicate the story a little, imagine that these people also give me stories in English, which I understand, and they then ask me questions in English about these stories, and I give them back answers in English. Suppose also that after a while I get so good at following the instructions for manipulating the Chinese symbols and the programmers get so good at writing the programs that from the external point of view, that is, from the point of view of somebody outside the room in which I am locked, my answers to the questions are absolutely indistinguishable from those of native Chinese speakers.
Nobody just looking at my answers can tell that I don't speak a word of Chinese.
Let us also suppose that my answers to the English questions are, as they no doubt would be, indistinguishable from those of other na- Thus Searle's rulebook describes a procedure which, if carried out accurately, allows him to participate in an exchange of uninterpreted symbolssquiggles and squoggles -which, to an outside observer, look as though Searle is accurately responding in Chinese to questions in Chinese about stories in Chinese; in other words, it appears as if Searle, in following the rule book, actually understands Chinese, even though Searle trenchantly continues to insist that he does not understand a word of the language.
According to Bishop [Bishop(2004) [Rey(2002) ]. Nevertheless, although opinion on the argument remains divided, most commentators now agree that the CRA helped shift research in Articial Intelligence away from classical computationalism (which, pace Newell and Simon [Newell(1976) ], viewed intelligence fundamentally in terms of symbol manipulation) rst to a sub-symbolic neural-connectionism and more recently, moving even further away from symbols and representations, towards embodied and enactive approaches to cognition. Clearly, whatever the verdict on the soundness of Searle's Chinese room argument, the subsequent historical response oers eloquent testament to his conclusion that`programs are not minds'. This paper is not an attempt to buttress the CRA. In what follows, we will briey review the`System' and`Robot' replies, before introducing a number of successes in a new branch of robotics that contributes to blurring the divide between biological and articial systems. We aim to use these examples to articulate a response to current trends in cognitive robotics in line with Searle's position as espoused in the CRA. To cut to the gist, we show that if the CRA holds then it also holds against both cognitive robotics and bio-machine hybrids (animats) [as currently engineered].
The systems reply
The systems reply originated from researchers who took a bird's eye view of Searle's thought experiment. To them, understanding does not lie within Searle, but within the system as a whole. That is, the room plus Searle, plus the rulebook, plus the sheets of paper [on which are inscribed the various squiggles and squoggles], as it is all these things -the system -as a whole that exhibits the responses perceived as Chinese. Searle responds to this by pointing out that, even if he internalised [memorised] the rulebook and all the paper squiggles and squoggles, and hence interacted with the native Chinese speakers directly, laboriously following the instructions of the rulebook as memorised, he would still not understand a word of Chinese.
The robot reply
The robot reply acknowledges that understanding requires some degree of interaction with the world. Proponents of this position extend the CRA to a robot that interacts with the world through actuators, and`perceives its world' through appropriate sensors. Using a procedure similar to Searle's rulebook, a computer decides the appropriate symbolic control signals (squoggles) in response to the symbolic descriptions of the world (squiggles) that its sensors present; surely in this case the robot, interacting with the world appropriately at all times, could be said to genuinely`understand'. . . However, by making what is now a well rehearsed move, Searle once again claims that as both the squiggles and squoggles remain merely uninterpreted symbols, a series of binary digits, they would remain meaningless to him as he followed the instructions in the rule book and controlled the robot's behaviour; in other words, that Searle in controlling the robot via the rule book would understand nothing of the robot's interactions with the world and thus -as there is nothing a computer would have that Searle, scraps of paper and rule book do not -neither would the robot.
In other words, the situation Searle describes highlights that, in merely executing its control program, it would always fail to obtain the intimate connection with the world required to give rise to genuine intentional states, genuine understanding and genuine meaning.
The Brain Simulator reply
The third reply assumes an accurate computer model of the neural mechanisms at play in the brain of a native Chinese speaker, as they respond to questions in Chinese about a story in Chinese. Advocates of this move in the debate assert that to deny genuine understanding to a hi-delity neural simulation would be tantamount to denying understanding to the native Chinese speakers themselves.
Searle responds to this proposal by suggesting a replacement of the neurons and synapses with a complex functional analogue [of the neural simulation of the native Chinese speaker's brain] constructed from an interconnection of water-pipes and valves, each of which he would activate according to a rulebook upon receiving a specic series of squiggles as input and then, contingent upon specic ows at the output of this water-pipe network, the rule book would specify which Chinese ideographs to output. Perhaps not surprisingly, Searle once again concludes that, to him [and the network of pipes], the Chinese ideographs remain meaningless.
Hybrid systems and levels of embodiments
The replies to Searle's thought experiment describe situations that are both relevant and conceivable: each situation emphasises particular perspectives of the CRA, and could give rise to further investigation in the form of actual physical/biological experiments with tangible implementations. Today's proponents of so-called embodied AI, a eld now known as cognitive robotics, take at least some of Searle's comments seriously in that cognitive robotics acknowledges that mere syntactical manipulation of uninterpreted symbols is insucient for understanding and emphasises the importance of embodiment in intelligent action [Pfeifer(2001) ]. This work has employed extremely varied strategies, the success of which, however, remains debatable [Roesch(in press) ].
Interestingly, a fourth line of reply to the CRA (Searle calls the`combination reply') involves a mix of the previous three replies. In this particular situation, one assumes the examination of a robot in the world, operated by a synthetic brain modelled after a native Chinese speaker. Searle agrees with the contenders of this line of thought: I entirely agree that in such a case we would nd it rational and indeed irresistible to accept the hypothesis that the robot had intentionality, as long as we knew nothing more about it.. [Searle(1980) , our emphasis]. Once we understood that its behaviour was in fact the result of a [very complex] rule book, we would retract our initial hypothesis and deny the system had genuine understanding.
Complex rule books
Historically, Articial Intelligence (AI) practitioners have been incredulous at the extreme simplicity of the low-level rules described by Searle (and actually deployed in a famous experimental`recreation' of the CRA by Harré and Wang [Harré and Wang(1999) ]) that simply`correlate one set of formal symbols with another set of formal symbols`merely by their shape', such that typically very trivial combinations of un-interpreted symbols -squiggles -map simply onto others -squoggles. It has always seemed likely to such AI experts that any machine understanding program with a claim to real-world generality would require a very large and complex rule-base (program), typically applying very high-level rules (functions) 5 and make extensive use of internal variables 5 In contrast to the thirteen basic ideographs deployed by Harré and Wang, IBM's WAT-SON system -which recently won world wide acclaim as rivalling the greatest human players of the USA TV game show`Jeopardy' -eectively deployed a complex high-level rule book (literally thousands of complex algorithms working in parallel) on the full gamut of natural human language.
(`pieces of paper' onto which the man in the room [Searle] can scribble symbols and dene internal`representations').
However, it is equally clear from`Minds, Brains and Programs' [Searle(1980) ] that Searle intended the CRA to be fully general -applicable to any conceivable [now or future] AI program (grammar-based; rule-based; neural network; Bayesian etc):`I can have any formal program you like, but I still understand nothing '. So if the CRA succeeds, it must succeed against even the most complex`high-level' systems.
So, in a spirit of cooperation (between computer scientists, AI practitioners and Searle) let us consider a more complex formal program/rule book-system which has (as one high-level-rule) a call to, say, Google-translate. We suggest that these`internal representations' scribbled on bits of paper, used by the man in the room (monoglot Searle), could now maintain [at least partial] interpretations of the [unknown] Chinese text, as`symbol-strings-in-English'.
In this way it is plausible that, via a process analogous to one's gradual understanding of a Chinese text via the repeated use of a Chinese-English dictionary, the application of [grounded] high-level-rules (Google-translate) to Chinese text would, over time, foster the emergence of genuine semantics and understanding in even a monoglot English speaker like Searle. Because both the rule book and any internal representations the rule book requires (Searle's scribbles on paper') are encoded in English, and ex hypothesisi Searle brings to the room an understanding of English, we suggest, after Boden [Boden(1988) ], that over time this extended English Reply would lead to the emergence of genuine semantics for Searle.
But does a computer Central Processing Unit 6 (CPU) really`understand' its program and its variables [encoded as raw binary data] in a manner analogous to Searle's understanding of his rule book and internal-representations encoded in English? In her 1988 paper (ibid) Maggie Boden suggests that, unlike say the human-driven manipulations of formal logic, it does; because, unlike the rules of logic, the execution of a computer program`actually causes events to happen (e.g. it reads and writes data [or instructions] to memory and peripherals)' and such`causal semantics' enable Boden to suggest that it is a mistake to regard [executing] computer programs as pure syntax and no semantics; such a CPU processing Chinese symbols really does have a`toehold' on [Chinese] semantics. The analogy here is to Searle's understanding of the English language rule book and hence the [extended, high-level] English reply holds.
In the`Philosophical Investigations' Wittgenstein points out [Wittgenstein(1958) ] that there is a fundamental dierence between normative rule-following and acting in accordance with rules (obeying physical laws). In contrast to Boden, we assert that the execution of a computer program is merely acting in accordance with physical laws; the CPU does not understand its internal-6 A CPU is the core component of a computer system that executes program instructions (its algorithm or rule book) by physically, and in most modern computers typically electronically, fetching or storing (reading or writing) them to and from memory and evaluating their coded commands.
representations [as it executes its program and input] any more than water in a stream`understands' its ow down hill; both are processes strictly entailed by their current state and that of the environment (their`input').
Furthermore, as Cassirer [Cassirer(1944) ] suggested, we do not consider the computer as it executes its program with particular input(s) an`information processor' with a concomitant`toe-hold in semantics', because we consider that the [physical] computer does not process rich semantic`symbols' (which belong to the human realm of discourse), rather mere un-interpreted`signals' (binary digits [±5V]): objects devoid of meaning which belong to the world of physics.
All syntax and no semantics 7 -as there is no genuine sense in which the CPU understands its rule book in a manner analogous to Searle's understanding of English, we suggest that a CPU executing its program is simply not analogous to monoglot-Searle's gradual understanding of a Chinese text via repeated use of an English/Chinese dictionary.
To reect that the CPU merely mechanically transforms the signals it processes we simply insist that the rule book is dened only by syntactical operations (albeit perhaps more complex than the simple`correlations' originally suggested by Searle and physically deployed by Harré and Wang) and the internal-representations (`scribbles on paper'), must remain doggedly dened by meaningless signals (i.e. un-interpreted symbols; aka Searle's`squiggles and squoggles').
It is clear that, even allowing the rule book to deploy high-level calls to, say, Google-translate, no understanding of the underlying Chinese text can ever emerge because the`internal-representations' Searle is forced to manipulate remain uninterpreted (`squiggles and squoggles'). The process is analogous to monoglot Searle's frustrated attempts to understand an unknown Chinese text using only a Chinese dictionary.
On epistemology and ontology
In further reection on the System reply to the CRA, John Haugeland [Haugland(2002)] asks why we should accept Searle's conclusion that the internalised Chinese subsystem doesn't understand Chinese given that its responses to the Chinese questions are correct and indistinguishable from those a native Chinese speaker may give:
What we are to imagine in the internalization fantasy is something like a patient with multiple personality disorder. One personality, Searle, is uent in English (both written and spoken), doesn't know a word of Chinese, and is otherwise perfectly normal (except that he has the calculative powers of a mega idiot savant). The other ostensible personality -let's call him Hao -is uent in Chinese (though only writ-7 Syntax is not the same as, nor by itself is it sucient for, semantics, [Searle(1992) ].
ten, not spoken), has no English, and, moreover, apart from seeming to be able to read and write, is deaf, dumb, blind, and paralyzed.
Why, exactly, should we conclude that Hao doesn't understand the
Chinese that he appears to be reading and writing (automatically, as it were)?
Haugeland suggests Searle's internalisation response equivocates on the use of the word`in' and subsequently deduces that Searle is not entitled to assert that,`were Hao to understand Chinese, so would [Searle] '; hence Haugeland claims Searle's internalisation response to the System reply is simply not logically sound.
Phenomenal aspects of understanding
To unpack Haugeland's claim, let us compare the responses of the two systems -Hao and Searle -in the case where Searle rst listens to a joke in Chinese and then in English. In the former case, although Searle may make the right linguistic responses in Chinese, he will never`get the joke' and`feel the laughter' because he, John Searle, still doesn't really understand a word of Chinese; whereas in the latter case he may well`get the joke', nd it funny and laugh because he really does understand English. In other words, the behaviour will not entail understanding, but the understanding will entail the appropriate behaviour.
Similarly, for all a small child may laugh at a sequence of adult jokes, she will not feel the laughter appropriately and hence will not really understand the jokes. In other words, there is a fundamental`dierence in kind' (an ontological distinction) between these two cases. This is perhaps not so surprising as in the former case ex hypothesi as Searle-as-Hao is merely carrying out ungrounded, uninterpreted symbol manipulations; whereas in the latter case Searle's command of his native tongue is grounded by consciousness of his body and his interactions with the world and society.
In the absence of any linguistically-grounding`conscious sensations of laughter' accompanying Searle's execution of the Hao program, we doubt that by any normal use of the word`understand' anyone can, legitimately, claim Searleas-Hao understands the Chinese story anymore than the young child`understands' adult jokes; demonstrably [in this case] mere outward behaviour alone is not sucient to tease apart the two situations.
Hence we suggest that there is a fundamental ontological (contra epistemological) distinction between Searle-as-Hao and Searle-as-native-Englishspeaker; a dierence that cannot be teased apart by mere observation of exter- But if the CRA is correct and the mere computer simulation of a neural network is not sucient for understanding, perhaps the addition of a biological neural network would overcome the CRA? We now argue that recent technological advances, which contribute to blurring the divide between biological and articial systems, may serve as a vehicle to push this examination further.
In particular, we focus on so-called animats [Franklin(1997) , Wilson(1985) Before reaching this stage, however, extensive testing has to be performed on seemingly simpler brains, like that of rodents. Recently, implant technology has made huge advances in moving from simple passive electrodes for stimulation to implanting whole electronic circuits capable of performing complex functions. Berger et al., for instance, successfully demonstrated implants that replaced a rat's hippocampus during a spatial memory task: when the device was inactivated, the animal failed the behavioural task; its performance was restored when the device was switched back on [Berger et al(2011) Berger, Hampson, Song, Goonawardena, Marmarelis, and Another example comes from John Chapin's group, whose implant coupled reward and sensory processing areas in an operant conditioning procedure to train the rat to respond behaviourally to particular tactile stimulations [Talwar et al(2002) Talwar, Xu, Hawley, Weiss, Moxon, and Chapin]. Upon several days of training, the`programmed rodent' was able to follow commands, henceforth behaving similar to a remote-controlled animal 10 . See also Gradinaru et al Gradinaru, Thompson, Zhang, Mogri, Kay, Schneider, and Deisseroth], who used optogenetic techniques to stimulate neurons selectively, inducing motor behaviour without requiring conditioning.
From an intuition pump to the physical realisation of thought experiments
Does our animat, which successfully avoids obstacles, genuinely understand it is facing a wall? Can the remote-controlled mouse, which turns left in innite loops as long as the device is switched on, be said to understand genuinely what it is doing, and why? How about the remote-controlled rat that blindly follows motor commands; does it understand the input it receives?
The situations we described, we posit, push Searle's CRA a little bit further, permitting the philosophical exploration of the fth line of reply to the CRA, that of the robot endowed with a brain much alike to a biological brain. Notably, they pose that a functional body is required to support consciousness, and that such a body needs to be a self-regulating system comprising its own internal, homeodynamic processes and capable of sensorimotor coupling with the outside world (p. 363), a conception at the heart of the enactive approach to cognitive science, and conclude that consciousness is a function of life-regulation processes involving dense couplings between neuronal and extraneuronal systems, rather than a function of neural systems alone (p.
379).
We argue that, even though their interest in this thought experiment lies in the dening features of consciousness, their argument might as well apply to intentionality. In fact, as an analogue of Cosmelli and Thompson's brainin-a-vat, we suggest that the impoverished notion of a body that serves the animat equally oers no hope for anything more than mere sensorimotor coupling to arise.
The lack of proper embodiment is, however, only part of the problem, as demonstrated by the remote-controlled rodent experiments. In these cases, the chimera is constituted by a fully functional, living body that is endowed with an articial device that transmits electrical signals to the brain, to which it responds. The crux of this paper is that behaviorally, the remote-controlled animals seem to lose something more than just free-will and volition. This is because there is no element of the animal's intrinsic makeup that would cause it to behave of its own accord in a way similar to that imposed onto it by the experimenter, and hence it is extremely unlikely that it would ever acquire understanding of such externally imposed behaviours 11 . This is in spite of the fact that, in contrast to an animat, this implanted rodent is obviously a case of perfect embodiment, though the experimenter articially manipulates the rodent's tissues. These manipulations produce sensory-motor couplings that result in the rodent experiencing the world consistent with the induced actions.
The fundamental aw is that these induced couplings would not be the eect of the intrinsic nervous system's constraints (metabolic or otherwise) at any level. To the contrary, they are the cause of metabolic demands; demands that are incurred through the experimenter's manipulations. Since the experimenter drives the sensorimotor couplings in an arbitrary way (from the perspective of metabolic needs of animal or its cellular constituents), the causal relationship between the bodily milieu and the motor actions and sensory readings would be disrupted. However, according to the enactive approach, only the right type and directionality of such couplings can ultimately lead to understanding and intentionality.
11 Unless the imposed behaviours happened to exactly synchronise with natural behaviours appropriate to the rodent, given all of its bodily needs and desires, at that point in time.
The above argument is an elaboration on Cosmelli and Thompson's brainin-a-vat critique. A recently proposed synthesis of computational paradigms oered by the authors [Spencer et al(2013)Spencer, Tanay, Roesch, Bishop, and Nasuto] puts forward an alternative but complementary argument which also ties in with the fundamental arguments by Howard Pattee deriving from the cybernetic tradition on the nature of symbols in biological systems [Pattee(1995)] which was also extended towards brain [Cariani(2001) ] and higher cognition [R¡czaszek-Leonardi(2012) ]. It appears that the most encompassing conception of computation [Spencer et al(2013)Spencer, Tanay, Roesch, Bishop, and Nasuto] performed by any system rests on the existence of internal dynamics that is capable of generating a ow in the system state space. The most basic implication of this is that it aords the existence of dierent system congurations or states; without such potential there can be no computation of any form (continuous or discrete, symbolic or distributed). However, dynamics are not sucient to instantiate computations, since computations require constraints.
It is the constraints that enable the algorithm to`shape' the ow, and an instantiation of a specic trajectory starting from a specic initial condition corresponds to an execution of a programme. The nature of the state space and that of constraints will be specic for the dierent computational paradigms but they all share in common that the constraints are externally imposed and are used by the programmer so that the dynamical ow can be meaningfully interpreted. Thus, the constraints do not have an intrinsic meaning in computations, the meaning is imposed on them, and only via their skilful use can the resultant dynamics lead to meaningful results. We posit that, in light of the above, the manipulations of a neural culture in an animat or even of the brain in the remote-rat are nothing else but a form of imposing such external con- Referring back to our computationalist framework [Spencer et al(2013)Spencer, Tanay, Roesch, Bishop, and Nasuto] , that means that even if one were to describe cognitive agents in computational terms one is forced to conceive the closest computational analogy of a very special kind. For these are the systems that are not only, following Pattee [Pattee(1995) ] and R¡czaszek-Leonardi [R¡czaszek- Leonardi(2012) ], capable of supporting replicable constraints at both biological and cognitive level but which are eectively capable of setting such constraints for themselves, in order to modify their own innate dynamics supporting the`computation'. It is this self-referential nature of cognitive systems that bootstraps the meaning of replicable constraints/symbols to the meaning of the computation`executing' by the innate dynamics constraint in this way. It should be also clear from our overview of a wide range of computational paradigms discussed in theoretical computing [Spencer et al(2013) Spencer, Tanay, Roesch, Bishop, and Nasuto] that none of them comes even close to such a system, all being some forms of formal, externally driven symbol manipulation.
Without this, neither animats, nor the remote-controlled rodents experiments can escape Searle's CRA. This argument lends support to discussions of the properties grounding the agent-environment system. Fröese and Ziemke, for instance, discuss the foundational role of constitutive autonomy and adaptivity [Froese and Ziemke(2009) ] for agency and sense making, and their consequences for the design of embodied AI.
Summary and conclusion
In this paper, we based a philosophical examination of the requirements for genuine understanding and intentionality on extensions to John Searle's Chinese Room Argument against strong AI. Our deployment of Searle's intuition pump to recent advances in robotics and neuroscience shows it continues to have force against the most recent developments in robotics and bio-machine hybrids. Specically, we examined how two new scenarios fare in light of the CRA's typical replies from the AI community. We focused on so-called animats, autonomous robots that are controlled by biological neural tissue, and what may be described as remote-controlled rodents, living animals endowed with augmented abilities provided by articial controllers. These two chimeras can be seen as the two sides of the same coin, and herein we have demonstrated that neither of these systems can be said to exhibit any genuine understanding of the world.
In addition, we argue that current eorts in cognitive robotics, to endow robots with abilities to represent the world and reason about it, are limited. In line with the rise of enactive cognitive science -which proposes an enlarged perspective that includes the closed-loop interactions of a life-regulated body-brain dynamical system with an evolving world -we deem inappropriate cognitivism and its concomitant computational theory of mind, and instead emphasise the role of foundational processes such as autonomy, exploration, autopoiesis and social embedded-ness, in giving rise to a genuine understanding of our lived world.
